

APPENDIX C

THE PRACTICE OF RECRUITING
AMERICANS IN THE USA AND
THIRD COUNTRIES

A Western security service has obtained a copy of a top secret KGB training manual entitled *The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries*. The format states that the manual was "published in accordance with the plan for editorial publishing work of [KGB Higher] School 101, approved by the leadership of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers, USSR." The authors are identified as Y. M. Bruslov, N. S. Skvortsov, L. A. Byzov, V. M. Ivanov, and N. G. Dyukov.

The manual specifies the more important KGB targets in the United States; outlines, step by step, the methods the KGB customarily employs in recruiting Americans; and mentions some of the problems the KGB encounters in attempting to suborn Americans. To illustrate recruitment methods, the authors reconstructed a number of actual KGB operations in the United States. However, they endeavored to disguise these somewhat by using pseudonyms for the Americans involved, omitting the names of KGB personnel, and changing the names of locales and institutions.

The strictures and themes set forth in the manual all are consistent with what is known from other sources about KGB attitudes and practices. But any doubt about its authenticity was removed after the FBI received a copy. For the FBI eventually was able to identify some of the people referred to in the case examples, despite the efforts of the authors to disguise them.

Those who obtained the manual translated it into English for intelligence rather than literary purposes. As a consequence, the style and expressions are purely Soviet and they reflect the degeneration that has occurred in the Russian language during the past fifty years. Some sections of the manual, composed of standard communist polemics of the sort one may read in the Soviet

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES

347

gress, have been deleted as irrelevant. Some other sections have been summarized or omitted because they seemed tediously repetitious or trivial. Unfortunately, an important page of the translated copy of the text procured by the author is illegible; its absence is noted. The relatively few explanatory, transitional, or summary comments deemed necessary appear in italics. Otherwise, what follows is extracted and translated verbatim from *The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third Countries*.

The introduction of the textbook begins with the necessary and standard phrases to the Party couched in vintage communist jargon. Its essence is that the overriding mission of "Soviet intelligence" is to procure information that other nations do not wish the Soviet Union to have. Arriving at the point, it states:

Soviet intelligence can accomplish this task successfully with the aid of a competent agent network capable of obtaining the secret information in which we are interested. The acquisition of such an agent network in the countries of the principal adversary, particularly in the U.S., is the most important operational task of Soviet intelligence.

The recruitment of such an agent network among Americans has a number of peculiar characteristics and difficulties, dependent in large part on whether recruitment is carried out in the U.S. or in third countries.

The purpose of this text is to point out the particular characteristics of recruiting Americans and to disseminate certain beneficial experiences of Soviet Foreign Intelligence Legal Residencies in the recruitment of Americans in the U.S. and in third countries under present conditions, as well as to show how Soviet Foreign Intelligence is solving the task of acquiring an agent network among the Americans.

The text examines such problems as the basis for recruitment [*verbovoch-naya baza*], methods of spotting, and methods of assessing Americans, with the aim of subsequently determining the most effective means of inducing them to collaborate with Soviet Foreign Intelligence, and the accomplishment of recruitment itself.

The material is presented in approximately the same sequence as that used in development for recruitment.

The authors hope that this text will be of definite assistance to intelligence officers, particularly to the inexperienced, in organizing and carrying out intelligence operations against the U.S.

1. THE BASIS FOR RECRUITMENT IN THE U.S.

At the present time KGB Residencies in the U.S. are faced with an extremely important task: the development of agent networks capable of obtaining secret information on the military and political plans of the U.S. government; on new discoveries and inventions in science and technology; on the work of American intelligence and counterintelligence organs; and on the activities of international organizations—the U.N. and others—which are located in the United States.

The basic targets of our agent penetration (operations) are as follows:

- The President's Cabinet and the National Security Council;
- The State Department, including its representatives in New York, the U.S. delegation to the U.N., the Passport Office of the State Department, etc.;
- The U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), the military intelligence organs of this department, and the Permanent Military Group of the NATO Staff in the U.S.;
- The Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- The National Association of Manufacturers, and the most important monopolies and banking houses, which have a direct influence on the U.S. government;
- The most important scientific centers and laboratories; . . .

(Here a page of the copy available to the author is illegible.)

- The governing organs of the leading political parties in the U.S. and other influential public and political organizations—trade unions, youth [organizations], journalistic [organizations], etc.;
- The diplomatic and commercial representations of foreign countries in the U.S., and also the Secretariat of the U.N. and foreign representations in the U.N.

In carrying out these tasks, our Residencies must, first of all, thoroughly study the basis for recruitment.

Purposefulness in the recruitment operations of our Residencies is achieved through the identification of Americans who have intelligence potential and sufficiently strong motives that could lead them to collaborate with Soviet Foreign Intelligence. The following categories of individuals are of operational interest to Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residencies in this connection:

- Employees of government institutions who are cleared for secret political, economic, military, scientific and technical, and intelligence and counter-intelligence information;
- Employees of nongovernmental institutions and organizations who, because of their activities or interests, have access to the state secrets of the country against which intelligence operations are being carried out—correspondents, employees of technical bureaus and firms, representatives of emigrant groups and foreign intelligence agents;
- Employees of private firms who have access to secret scientific and technical and economic information;
- Persons who have good prospects of joining government organizations. This relates primarily to students in educational institutions which supply the personnel for organizations having an interest in intelligence. In addition, our Residencies are also interested in other persons who hold certain jobs and have personal qualities which make their recruitment possible.

Correct determination of the basis for recruitment, that is, of the motives which lead us to conclude that a person of interest can be induced to collaborate, is of great importance to successfully organizing his development for recruitment. Thus, for example, the following factors can serve as a basis for recruiting employees of government institutions:

- Sympathies toward the U.S.S.R., as a consistent striver for peace;
- Dissatisfaction with the rigid policy of the U.S. government toward civil servants--infringement on the rights of the individual;
- Surveillance of government employees; study of their way of life, contacts, etc.;
- Dissatisfaction with the domination by large monopolies which use the U.S. government apparatus for purposes of repression (such dissatisfaction with the uncontrolled activities of the large monopolies is most frequently found in government functionaries, persons from laboring families, and in employees lacking sufficient financial security);
- Availability of confirmed information on the financial difficulties of a government employee or of serious compromising information which could cost him his job.

The following are exploited when establishing relationships with scientists and important specialists:

- The desire of specialists to sell us the technical secrets of their firms;
- The desire of scientists to establish scientific contacts with representatives of the U.S.S.R. (particularly noticeable in persons who have left Russia).

When determining the basis for establishing intelligence relationships with representatives of business circles, account is taken of the fact that businessmen can assist the intelligence service on the basis of such motives as:

- Monetary reward for the passing of technical information and new models;
- The desire to trade with the Soviet Union or with other countries of the socialist system. Particular interest in such trade can be evoked by the possibility of concluding deals which make it possible for the businessman to pay his taxes, which come to large amounts.

The identification of persons in the government apparatus who sympathize with us ideologically is of great importance for our recruitment operations in the U.S.

Here the text digresses into a polemic asserting that the collapse of monopolistic capitalism is imminent and that "Marxist-Leninist ideas" are gaining acceptance in the West. Returning to the subject, the text summarizes the recruitment of an American scientist, identified as "Put," whom the Russians had spotted as a prospective ideological sympathizer. This and many other cases to follow are cited as case-study material.

350

KGB

The Soviet intelligence officer established an acquaintance with Put on the recommendation of another of our intelligence officers who had known Put during the Second World War.

This intelligence officer went to Put's home with a letter from his friend and within two or three months became a friend of Put and his family—of his wife, children, and brother. During the first meetings, our intelligence officer succeeded in dissuading Put from phoning him at work or at his apartment and from telling his friends about their acquaintance. These precautions and the clandestine behavior on the part of the intelligence officer prior to his meetings with Put made it possible to conceal our contact with Put from the FBI.

In the course of their meetings, our intelligence officer convinced Put of the correctness of our activities, and he came to sympathize with the Soviet Union. We learned that Put was planning to present some of his most recent work at one of the international congresses. With this aim, he asked a friend—a well-known progressive who had visited our embassy in Washington—to give this work to the scientific attaché at our embassy. Having learned of this, the intelligence officer chided Put in a friendly way for not asking the intelligence officer's help and for turning to his American acquaintance, which was not entirely safe despite the progressive views of the latter. Put took this conversation seriously. This helped our intelligence officer to convince Put of the need for a subsequent clandestine meeting with him in the city.

Through further work, the intelligence officer developed Put to the point where he began to photograph information and pass it to him on film during brush contacts and through various dead-drops.

As is evident for this example, the development of Put for recruitment was relatively uncomplicated and did not require a great deal of effort on the part of the intelligence officer. This is explained by Put's ideological affinity with us, by his readiness to help us if possible.

When selecting candidates for recruitment, however, it is wrong to consider persons such as Put to be the basic source. It would be a mistake to assume that there are many such people in U.S. government institutions. According to available information, the U.S. counterintelligence organs spend as much as \$5,000 to investigate the political views of every candidate for a job in any government institution. The FBI checks on the loyalty of employees throughout the time they serve the government. Politically unsound persons are fired from their jobs or deprived of access to secret work if the smallest signs of insufficient political trustworthiness are found. This is testified to by the fact, which has become known to the Soviet intelligence service, that one American, who because of his convictions was attracted to the Quakers,* was transferred from the intelligence service of the State Department to ordinary line administration within the department. Under such conditions, government employees hide their dissatisfaction with the policies of the government for fear of losing their jobs. The aid of an experienced agent network, or of confidential contacts [*doveritel* "naya svyaz"] used as spotters, is needed to identify them.

In recruiting operations in the U.S., much attention is paid both to re-

* (Footnote from the KGB text.) The Quakers are one of the Christian Protestant sects in the U.S. and are currently manifesting pacifist tendencies.

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 351

recruitment on a material basis and to recruitment on the basis of compromising materials.

Correct use of the factor of material interest first of all requires an understanding of the psychological makeup of the American, who soberly regards money as the sole means of ensuring personal freedom and independence, of making it possible for him to satisfy his material and spiritual needs. In the average American, this attitude toward money engenders an indifference to the means by which it is obtained, although sometimes involving risk.

At the same time it should be kept in mind that the relatively high standard of living in the U.S. is maintained by plundering the peoples of other countries. Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that an employee of a U.S. government institution can be encouraged to collaborate with Soviet intelligence for a pittance. In order to understand this question clearly, it is useful to be familiar with the amounts earned by Americans working in government institutions. . . .

These data indicate that during the process of development, and particularly at recruitment, determination of the monetary income of an American is an extremely important matter. On one hand, the money which is offered should not give the person being developed unfounded illusions that he is to receive large amounts of money for his work with us; on the other, the person under development must be firmly convinced of the readiness of our intelligence service to compensate him for services that involve the risk of losing his job in a governmental organization and of being taken to court. Obviously, a government employee who is being developed with the aim of recruitment on a material basis will not agree to collaborate with Soviet intelligence for \$50 or \$100 a month.

When selecting candidates for recruitment on the basis of compromising materials, great importance is attached to information which, if revealed, could actually do serious harm to the person who is concealing it from those surrounding him. To solve this problem, it is sometimes necessary to have specific knowledge of American legislation and regulations which determine the official policy regarding particular government organizations, private firms, and various institutes engaged in work subsidized by the U.S. government. It should be kept in mind that the most important information that could compromise an American consists of data on the commission of serious crimes at work, usually related to illegal appropriation of large sums of money, and also information to the effect that he is a homosexual.

The text at this point quotes extensively from U.S. statutes prohibiting government employees from accepting bribes and indulging in conflicts of interest. It also notes that the government considers communist affiliations and homosexuality sufficient grounds for dismissing employees from sensitive positions.

These orders of U.S. authorities testify how serious must be the information compromising an American. Information on the commission of such moral crimes as promiscuous relationships with women usually cannot serve as convincing compromising material.

352

KGB

When selecting candidates for development, account should be taken of the fact that, according to existing legislation, a person born in the U.S. automatically becomes a U.S. citizen.* He is not subjected to any discrimination in comparison with native [descended] Americans with regard to admission to educational institutions and in his progress at work. There are many examples of not only such persons but also immigrants being permitted access to secret material in the U.S. The latter, however, are not always good prospects for our Foreign Intelligence.

As a rule, an immigrant is a man of experience who has seen much of life, but he frequently is somewhat suspect among local police organs. The native American, while not usually having these shortcomings, feels a great love for the U.S. in contrast with first- or, at most, second-generation Americans. Immigrants are of interest due to the fact that, while possessing an equal right to access to secret materials, because of the influence of their parents they do not always consider the U.S. to be their homeland and therefore can more easily be persuaded to work for us.

As experience has shown, it is also useful to look for people of interest to us in the advanced classes of universities, among those who have temporarily left their secret work to complete their education.

2. THE ACQUISITION OF USEFUL CONTACTS AND THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR RECRUITMENT. THE INITIAL STAGE IN DEVELOPMENT FOR RECRUITMENT

The active operations of American counterintelligence force the Soviet intelligence officer to give the most serious consideration to the initial stage of any development for recruitment. Therefore, Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residencies in the U.S. devote great attention to the manners and methods by which intelligence officers acquire useful connections among Americans and establish personal contacts with them. Our intelligence officers seek unusual means for establishing acquaintances, rejecting the use of places controlled by the FBI for this purpose. For example, they rarely use official receptions inasmuch as an acquaintance which is begun there may immediately come to the attention of counterintelligence. For these reasons, under present operational conditions in the U.S., Soviet Intelligence Residencies give particular attention to proper organization of the initial stage of development for recruitment; that is, in establishing a new acquaintance with local citizens, they try to create or find conditions which ensure that the new contact will not attract the attention of American counterintelligence.

For purposes of generalizing some of the valuable operational experience of our Residencies in the U.S., all developments for recruitment carried out by Legal Residencies can be divided into the following groups:

1. Development for recruitment which is begun as a result of a personal acquaintance between our intelligence officer and an American. Development is carried out by the intelligence officer himself in cases when it is not feasible

* (Footnote from KGB text.) Meaning a person who is a child of immigrants.

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 353

to involve the agent network or when there is no direct need to do so, for example, when development is through the gradual involvement of an American who works with the intelligence officer in the same official organization, etc.

2. Development for recruitment which is carried out through an agent network or by intelligence officers themselves on the basis of data received in advance concerning the American and his intelligence potential. In cases where the intelligence officer participates in the development, these data make it possible, even before personal contact is established with the American, to designate a specific means for drawing him into collaboration with us as an agent. Such data may consist of compromising materials [or] information concerning the readiness of the American to help us on an ideological and political or material basis.

3. Development for recruitment which is carried out by an agent network that recruits the Americans under a false flag, without the personal participation of intelligence officers. Specially trained recruiters are used to carry out such requirements. . . .

The spotting, assessment, and selection of Americans for recruitment and the accomplishment of recruitment through recruiters remain the principal task of Soviet Foreign Intelligence in the U.S. Under these conditions, as formerly, great importance is attached to the ability of the intelligence officer in our Legal Residency to develop clandestinely and for recruitment the group of Americans to whom he has access.

Depending on the sequence for the assessment of Americans and the establishment of relations with them, all development of Americans for recruitment which is conducted personally by intelligence officers of Legal Residencies can be divided into two categories. The first group includes cases where the intelligence officers first become acquainted with the Americans and then discover their intelligence potential; the second group includes cases where they first receive information about Americans of interest to us, study the basis for establishing confidential or agent relations with them, and only then establish a personal acquaintance with them. The second method is more purposeful and provides better results.

We cannot, however, orient ourselves solely toward the development of Americans whose intelligence potential we know in advance. Our Legal Residencies organize purposeful acquaintances between their intelligence officers and the Americans of known intelligence potential and at the same time conduct operations to establish acquaintances between intelligence officers and Americans in general for the purpose of subsequently discovering persons of interest among them. With this in mind and taking into account the cover possibilities of intelligence officers, our Residencies assign them the task of making acquaintances in circles whose members have direct or indirect access to the targets set for Soviet Foreign Intelligence. This gives the work of the Residencies a purposefulness necessary for agent penetration of the designated intelligence targets.

Let us examine these possibilities.

Usually the cover of a Soviet intelligence officer provides him with the

354

KGB

necessary legal basis for being in the country against which our intelligence is operating and makes it possible for him to establish personal acquaintances among Americans.

In the U.S., in addition to ordinary cover, we use various international organizations and our representations in them. The most important of these is the United Nations and its branch institutions. The associations of Soviet representatives with foreigners at various international congresses and conferences, international congresses of scientists and specialists, etc., are also widely used for intelligence purposes. Here it is possible to become acquainted with individuals active in politics and labor unions, with scientific workers, and with persons engaged in cultural affairs and the arts.

The cover used by intelligence officers usually corresponds to the field of their intelligence operations. For example, intelligence officers who are collecting political information work in the press department and in the cultural affairs department of the embassy; intelligence officers collecting scientific and technical information are engaged with questions of technology, under the adviser of the embassy, and also work in Amtorg; intelligence officers who are occupied with questions of foreign counterintelligence and émigré operations work in the consular department, etc.

An intelligence officer's cover position is selected by taking into account his general education, his political and specialized training, work experience, and personal and business qualities. Under these conditions the intelligence officer can become acquainted with foreigners without his behavior being distinguishable from that of Soviet citizens employed by the given organization who are not connected with intelligence.

The wording of the next three paragraphs is abstruse. The meaning: To prevent counterintelligence services from identifying personnel engaged in espionage, the KGB tries to place officers in cover jobs that entail normal contact with foreigners. Additionally, it "enlists the services of" or "co-opts" Russian civilians whose work abroad involves them in legitimate relations with foreigners. The text continues:

The Soviet intelligence officer may become acquainted with an American with good prospects for development who by the nature of his activity has every reason for his overt meetings with Soviet representatives. Such Americans include businessmen and correspondents who are not subject to restrictions concerning friendships with Soviet representatives without notifying their superiors.

In acquiring useful contacts, it is more expedient to establish acquaintances with Americans in places other than those frequented by employees of Soviet organizations. This is explained by the fact that in these [other] places it is more difficult for the FBI to fix their attention on the useful acquaintances with Americans which are established by our intelligence officers and to bring these acquaintances under its own control.

As examples of sites where FBI surveillance best can be avoided, the text mentions business offices, universities, libraries, theaters, concert halls, parks,

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 355

clubs, restaurants, playgrounds, and similar public places. It stresses that to acquire plausible reasons for meeting Americans, KGB officers should develop hobbies such as golf, fishing, tennis, gardening, and stamp or coin collecting. It also recommends that they acquire specialized knowledge of art, science, or literature to increase the likelihood of having common interests with Americans. Finally, the text warns that Americans met accidentally or through "untested persons" may be FBI counterspies. It continues:

Our Residencies systematically collect information on Americans who have intelligence potential in order to make their acquaintance later on. They use agents and confidential contacts for this. In those cases where the Residency uses such information, it attempts to camouflage the source.

Soviet intelligence Residencies in the U.S. receive considerable assistance from the Center, which reports the results of spotting activity by our Residencies in third countries.

Use is also made of information received from "unwitting" individuals: personal data which is available from various Soviet missions and agencies; for example, information contained in correspondence between these institutions and foreigners, in visitors' books at exhibitions, in various announcements, etc.

To obtain information on foreigners with intelligence potential, use is also made of legal sources existing in the country against which we are conducting intelligence operations—the press, general information books (for example, *Who's Who*), U.S. diplomatic lists which contain biographical information on State Department employees, reference books on employees of the press, reference books which publish biographies of celebrities, etc.

Having received such information, the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residency determines the most expedient means of becoming acquainted with the American in whom it is interested, and either an agent or an intelligence officer is selected for these purposes. Depending on the capabilities of the Residency, a plan for making the acquaintance is worked out. Advance planning for establishing acquaintances with specific persons is more effective than the establishment of an acquaintance with Americans who are previously unknown to the Residency. In addition to the above means of establishing a relationship, the intelligence officer can "accidentally" meet the American, can visit him at his home under a convincing pretext, or can prepare a special combination of circumstances for this purpose in order to ensure that contact is established in such a way as to create conditions for further clandestine meetings with him.

For purposes of studying a person under development, experience shows that it is sometimes useful to take advantage of his departure for a third country, where conditions for agent operations are more favorable.

Below are given examples in which intelligence officers have successfully established contact with Americans with intelligence potential. . . .

An intelligence officer of the New York Residency, engaged in the collection of scientific intelligence, during a bus trip struck up a conversation with his neighbor, who worked on problems of radio direction finding. In the given case, the intelligence officer had no reason to suspect that the scientist was a plant, since he previously had not planned to travel by bus, and the idea of using this type of transportation came to him at the very last moment. Having

convinced himself that this was not an intentional encounter, the intelligence officer began to talk with the scientist, who expressed an interest in the Soviet Union. The intelligence officer—having studied the attitudes of his conversation partner—touched on questions of interest to himself. The scientist willingly continued this conversation and gave the intelligence officer some useful information. For example, he told about the lines being followed in research at his institution, which is subordinate to the Department of the Navy.

Wishing to consolidate a useful acquaintance, the intelligence officer proposed to the scientist that they meet in Washington, but the scientist did not go along with this proposal. He stated flatly that it wouldn't be healthy for him if his chief, an admiral, learned anything about their conversation. He personally did not share the views of his chief; he was ashamed of the reactionary policy of the American authorities, but he was not able to change anything in this regard and did not wish to subject himself to unpleasantness. He remarked that he would willingly meet with our worker somewhere under non-compromising circumstances and named a number of scientific associations, the meetings of which he attended from time to time.

A useful example can be found in the acquaintanceship of an intelligence officer in our New York Residency with an American of Ukrainian extraction, "Rok," whom we discovered when studying the contacts of one of our agents.*

The forty-year-old Rok was the head of a small engineering and technical planning firm which also filled orders for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agent characterized Rok as a simple man with little education, who passionately loved his firm but did not possess the necessary business qualities for the firm to be a success. By character, Rok was outgoing and made friends easily. However, because of a serious speech impediment—a bad stutter—he was unable to maintain these friendships. Therefore, he had almost no friends and frequently, in spells of loneliness, drank.

Having analyzed all this information, our Residency assigned the intelligence officer, with the aid of the agent, the task of arranging an "accidental" meeting with Rok in a restaurant. So that Rok would have no suspicions that the agent helped arrange this meeting, the following plan was drawn up.

The agent was to invite Rok to the restaurant twice in a row: the first time, the intelligence officer was to be present in the restaurant during their dinner so as to be able to recognize Rok; the second time, the agent would treat Rok to a good dinner and would leave "on business." After this, the intelligence officer would become acquainted with Rok.

The first meeting took place, but not exactly as planned. The intelligence officer arrived at the bar to carry out the identification. The agent and Rok appeared shortly thereafter. Stuttering, Rok loudly asked the agent to have another drink. The agent quickly adapted himself to the developing situation, refused the drink, and left on his business. Glancing around, Rok sat at the only remaining free place, which was next to the intelligence officer. Having ordered a cocktail, he began to talk to his neighbors. The intelligence officer decided to take advantage of this, to change the plan and become acquainted

* As used here, the term "agent" probably denotes an American already recruited by the KGB. However, it could refer to a KGB illegal being employed as a spotter of prospective recruits.

with him at once. It was easy for him to do this. After talking with Rok for several minutes, the intelligence officer paid for his cocktail and departed.

The next day, our intelligence officer phoned Rok and gave his name, which Rok recalled only after the intelligence officer mentioned the restaurant. Rok was pleased to hear from him and suggested that they meet for a drink. At the meeting the intelligence officer did not specifically state his nationality, telling Rok that he worked at the U.N. During this period, his role was mainly that of an "accidental" acquaintance.

During the next two meetings the intelligence officer, using Rok's peculiar characteristics, described above, quickly became close friends with him and began his active development. It was only during the third meeting that Rok learned that his new friend was Russian. He told this to the agent, but the latter replied that Rok's friendship was none of his business and that, in any case, he didn't remember the person Rok had met.

By this time the intelligence officer had firmly consolidated his acquaintance with Rok and had become his friend. The intelligence officer correctly understood that Rok had a yearning for his homeland and for people in general: it was difficult for him, a stutterer, to find someone with whom to talk. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the intelligence officer quickly won his confidence.

In a friendly manner the intelligence officer warned Rok not to call him at work. Rok didn't try to find out specifically why, convinced that his new friend had a good reason. This gave a clandestine character to their relationship, in that the intelligence officer had previously approached Rok only after a careful check. Thus, the possibility of an unwitting breach of security by Rok concerning his acquaintance with the intelligence officer existed only during the period when the intelligence officer was playing the role of a drinking companion previously unknown to Rok. With the aid of the agent network, the Residency ascertained that the agent was the only person whom Rok told at that time about his acquaintance with the intelligence officer. Therefore, it was possible to keep the relationship of the Soviet intelligence officer with Rok a secret.

As a friend, the intelligence officer asked Rok to acquire, for a friend in Moscow, a number of materials which were forbidden for sale to Soviet citizens. The intelligence officer paid Rok the cost of the materials he received, photographed them, and then returned them to Rok, who was quite willing to keep them at home. In addition, the intelligence officer paid Rok \$300 "commission." Thus, Rok set out on the path of direct intelligence collaboration.

In another case, a person of interest to us was shown to a Soviet intelligence officer in the following manner. The intelligence officer, who had contacts with an agent, went at a set time to a restaurant and sat at a small table. A second intelligence officer arrived later and occupied another small table, from which he could conveniently observe the actions of the first intelligence officer and could see the people entering the restaurant. When the agent appeared with the person of interest to us, the first intelligence officer gave a signal to the second. On the basis of a description, the second intelligence officer recognized the agent and began to observe his companion. Soon the intelligence officer succeeded in "accidentally" making the acquaintance of this

358

KGB

RECRU

American in another restaurant while remaining unknown to the agent who had acted as spotter.

Letters of recommendation are also used to make the acquaintance of Americans.

When approaching a foreigner with a letter of recommendation, a Soviet intelligence officer uses general information concerning the person making the recommendation; he recalls what the person looks like and the circumstances under which he obtained the letter. When handing over the letter, the intelligence officer casually mentions an event known to him from the life of the person making the recommendation and thus confirms his closeness to him. For this purpose, the intelligence officer selects facts which might interest his new acquaintance to whom he is handing the letter. By giving such information, it becomes easier to consolidate the acquaintance of the intelligence officer with the new person. . . .

If they are correctly prepared, these methods of making an acquaintance are used successfully by Soviet intelligence officers. However, a scornful attitude toward preliminary work can place the intelligence officer in a difficult position.

It is necessary to note that the use of letters of recommendation by our intelligence officers is known to U.S. counterintelligence organs. The American press frequently publishes information on this question in order to alert the population to the modus operandi of Soviet intelligence. Still, there is no reason to reject the use of letters of recommendation for intelligence purposes since, as in times past, they are widely used by persons who have no connection with intelligence. It is important that letters of recommendation and recruitment letters [*verbovochnoye pis'mo*] not be used in blackmail operations, as this would make it possible for the person being developed to realize the true intentions of our collaborator.

These are the basic methods of establishing acquaintances between our intelligence officers and Americans.

In their daily work, Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residencies and Soviet intelligence officers, when recruiting Americans, particularly within the U.S., should always bear in mind that American counterintelligence dangles its agents before our Foreign Intelligence Service.

The techniques and approaches used by the counterintelligence services in dangle operations take various forms at the present time. It is sometimes extremely difficult to discover them, and therefore careful analysis must be made of the behavior of persons under development in order to determine their true nature.

Experience has shown that one general feature is characteristic of all dangle operations—the person being dangled either attempts to interest us in his intelligence potential or he takes the initiative and offers to pass us certain secret materials. The display of such initiative is particularly characteristic in cases when our interest in the person being dangled declines or when the plant feels that we are rejecting him outright. A second characteristic feature of the behavior of persons being dangled is their disproportionate interest in money, which at times is manifested in self-seeking (there is every reason to assume that money received from our intelligence service serves as additional com-

pensati
break d
ties, for
places
Th
by the

figuring
offers to
our rel

dangle

other S

contact

In
their a
which

T
cumsta
changi

H
sible to
to help
our int
of the
way th

Service
this fa

confide
Never
the Ar
with S
officer
inform

V
partic

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 359

pensation for the plant). And finally, when, for one reason or another, we break off contacts with the plant, he takes active steps to restore the severed ties, for example even visiting an operational worker at his home and visiting places to which he normally doesn't go so as to arrange "accidental" meetings.

The Soviet Intelligence Service is aware of the following methods used by the FBI to insert a plant:

- It sends its agent to Soviet installations under the guise of a visitor, figuring that the information which the agent gives about himself or his specific offers to "help" us will arouse our interest and that we will take steps to develop our relationship with him;

- It uses persons in the categories described above as intermediaries to dangle their agents before Soviet intelligence officers as "prospective" contacts;

- It plants its own agents among persons connected with our embassy and other Soviet installations;

- It recruits an agent network among persons with liberal views who have contacts with Soviet institutions.

In some cases, the FBI and other U.S. counterintelligence organs dangle their agents before Soviet intelligence officers through contacts of our workers which they have discovered, using them on an unwitting basis. . . .

3. CARRYING OUT DEVELOPMENT FOR RECRUITMENT

The introduction of this section emphasizes that, except in unusual circumstances, recruitment should ideally be accomplished gradually by subtly changing a "normal" relationship into a conspiratorial one.

Holding a number of meetings of an ideological character makes it possible to develop the American to the point where he himself declares his desire to help the U.S.S.R., to aid in a progressive movement, or personally to help our intelligence service. In this case, the intelligence officer, taking advantage of the initiative displayed by the American, develops their relationship in such a way that it is given an intelligence character:

- Use is made of the times when an American turned to our Intelligence Service with a request for assistance in one or another matter without letting this fact become known to the persons surrounding him or to local authorities.

- The intelligence officer must understand that the establishment of such confidential relations with an American is a step toward intelligence relations. Nevertheless, the intelligence officer must establish confidential relations with the American in such a way that the latter does not surmise his connection with Soviet intelligence and his true intentions. For example, the intelligence officer takes steps to provide other convincing reasons for his interest in the information possessed by the American.

When consolidating relations with the person who is being developed, particular significance is attached to a favorable relationship with his family.

As experience shows, during the early stages of development, visits by the intelligence officer to the home of the person being developed, accompanied by his wife, are sometimes expedient. With the aid of his wife, the intelligence officer can clarify some of the data characterizing the American and can decide how to strengthen relations with the person being developed. The expediency of using the wife of the American in his further development depends upon the degree and the direction of her influence on her husband. In no case, however, should the wife of the person being developed know of the intelligence purpose of the development by our worker. If she does, she may have a negative influence on the results of the development.

There is an example of this in the operational experience of our New York Residency. A Soviet intelligence officer established friendly relations with the wife of an American engineer at the beginning of his development. This helped him to become friends with her husband and actively to develop him further. When the American had been recruited and had started to have clandestine meetings with us, his wife turned out to be the main stumbling block. Fearing for the fate of their children, she began to demand that her husband break off relations with our worker.

Our Legal Residencies in the U.S. have had valuable experience in carry-out development for recruitment. For example, the possibility of using a U.S. government employee in the interests of Soviet Intelligence can be seen from an extremely successful development for recruitment which was carried out when our Intelligence Service succeeded in establishing confidential relations with an employee of the State Department (we will call him "Koen") and obtained secret information from him in return for material compensation.

The course of this development was as follows. From a State Department information directory, it was learned that Koen was thirty years old and that he had received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1953. During the next four years he studied at three universities, including one in Washington. He then enrolled in a six-month preparatory course for employees of the State Department and, having completed it, worked there as an information clerk concerned with countries of the Far East.

Two days after becoming acquainted with him (they met in one of the clubs visited by diplomats), our intelligence officer called Koen at work from a public phone booth and arranged to meet him at the entrance of an international students' club that same evening. At the appointed time, the intelligence officer met Koen but took him to a restaurant rather than the club. Koen told our intelligence officer that he was an American of Anglo-Saxon background and that he came from a rather poor family. At one time he worked for the Veterans Administration. After graduation from the university, he succeeded in finding himself a job as an information clerk in the department for Far Eastern countries. His duties included processing telegrams received from U.S. embassies in the Far East and writing reports based on these telegrams for the directors of the department and for the Deputy Secretary of State. This took a lot of time: Koen frequently had to work until nine or ten o'clock at night. In addition, he was preparing himself for work at a U.S. embassy in the Far East. In this connection, he was taking foreign-language courses at the State Department.

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 361

Koen told the intelligence officer that he was a pacifist by conviction, and therefore was interested in the activity of Quaker organizations. Although he was not a member of the organization of Quakers in Washington, he frequently went to its meetings.

The intelligence officer noted a certain acquisitiveness in Koen. As it turned out, Koen lived in a poor section of Washington, where Negro families and low-paid Americans have their homes. Despite the fact that it was winter, Koen came to the meeting without an overcoat and in a rather threadbare suit. He appeared interested in our intelligence officer's remark that weekly English lessons pay \$90 to \$100 a month. At the end of the meeting, Koen thanked the intelligence officer for the good dinner.

The text proceeds to recount in minute detail how the KGB, exploiting the American's financial condition as well as his pacifist philosophy, slowly induced him to accept money first for innocuous unclassified information, then for significant secret data.

To illustrate that money should ordinarily not be offered crudely, the text next summarizes the recruitment of an American, referred to as Yang, employed by a scientific research firm in the Washington area. A visiting KGB scientist met the American, spoke about the desirability of free exchange of ideas among scientists, and ultimately offered to send a technical film he knew would greatly interest the American's employer.

While the firm was waiting for the film, the intelligence officer, as directed by the Residency, informed Yang that delivery of the desired film was being held up as they wanted to see it at the Soviet embassy in Washington. At the same time, the intelligence officer made the chance remark that a scientist friend badly needed certain nonsecret information from Yang's firm.

As expected, Yang, having already told the firm that he had received the film from us as a result of his good relations with Soviet scientists, began to pass us this information without notifying the head of the firm. Since the intelligence officer did not connect the transfer of the film with the receipt of the information, Yang was very pleased to think of this affair as a personal favor to our scientist. Yang gave us the confidential information of his firm. Incidentally, the second lot of material was received on a semiclandestine basis.

The problem then arose of how to solidify and strengthen this relationship. At this point it was decided that the scientist would offer Yang financial compensation for this information. Yang declined the compensation, declaring that this was a personal favor to the scientist.

Analyzing this refusal, the Residency concluded that possibly the attempt to offer Yang money was a mistake. Yang strove to prove himself an unselfish person in the eyes of the scientist. However, the Residency got the impression that Yang needed money, that his refusal was not genuine and that this was a sort of game with him.

Then it was decided to help him overcome these difficulties. For this purpose, a cover story was worked out according to which our scientist, who by this time was leaving for the U.S.S.R., wanted to give Yang a present for his birthday and for this reason left money with the intelligence officer.

362

KGB

REC

The intelligence officer decided to give Yang the money for the present during a luncheon at a suburban restaurant. Yang so skillfully assumed the pose of mild offense that he even managed to fool our intelligence officer, a young man who had only recently begun practical operations and who, disappointed with such an outcome, took the package of money out of his pocket, looked at it, and was about to put it back. This involuntary action of the intelligence officer was accompanied by an expression of obvious distress. Here Yang ceased to "resist." The intelligence officer felt Yang's hand on his knee, and Yang said in a businesslike tone, "Give me the money under the table."

After this, the development of Yang became easier. Having trained Yang to pass information for compensation on a regular basis, the intelligence officer "excluded" the scientist from the development and proposed that Yang obtain the information supposedly for one of his friends who worked in the Soviet Information Service. This concluded the recruitment. Yang still works effectively but even now always likes the transfer of money to be preceded by a discussion of his unselfish aid to Soviet science.

As an example of another successful recruitment, a Soviet intelligence officer from the very beginning accepted the task of establishing personal contact with the person of interest to him under secure conditions. He thoroughly thought out a plan for making this acquaintance that would guarantee the success of the development.

As an interpreter, an intelligence officer of our New York Residency accompanied a Soviet scholar who visited a number of institutes and firms while in New York. During a visit to a laboratory which was of particular interest to Soviet Scientific and Technical Intelligence, our intelligence officer turned his attention to one of the assistants. He was a poorly dressed young American and looked like a typical Jew. When the Soviet scholar was saying good-by to the leader of the group, who was an old friend, he (with prior agreement with the intelligence officer) said that he would like to send them a number of his scientific works. The intelligence officer interrupted this conversation and offered to help translate these works. "But we have our own translator," said the leader of the group, pointing to the aforementioned assistant. The scientist and the intelligence officer then bade farewell and left.

It was decided to utilize the transfer of this information to solidify the acquaintance with the young Jew, whom we will call "Kolumb." Judging by external appearances, Kolumb was poor, obviously not an Anglo-Saxon, and possibly came from a family of Jewish immigrants from Russia. Since he worked in such an important laboratory, he apparently was an American citizen by birth and not an immigrant. Kolumb was studying Russian and consequently was somewhat interested in our country. This was possibly an avenue to induce him to associate with us on the basis of ideological and political feelings. Since he was young, it would be possible to develop the element of comradeship which is difficult to do with older people.

In order that the acquaintance with Kolumb would not become known to the chief of the laboratory and other workers, the following plan was developed. The Residency sent its intelligence officer to the library of the laboratory and gave him the task of carefully determining the days and times the chief of the laboratory was away at the university giving lectures. On such a

day.
wait
obse
with

grou
of th
tellig
chief

inate
natu
versa
acqu
he w
librar
left v
office

phon
the p
cessfu

basice
from
Kolum
help
disser
enoug
this i
velop
chara
intelli
tionsh
of the

pare
(ther
includ
work
to arr
with

I
also v
his fie
recom
that I
was p
field,
(he n

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 363

day the intelligence officer would come to the laboratory during lunchtime, wait for the workers to appear, and having selected a convenient position to observe the situation would then approach Kolumb and begin a conversation with him.

But the unexpected took place: Kolumb came out of the laboratory with a group of workers, and the intelligence officer was forced to wait for the end of the lunch period. When Kolumb was the first to return from lunch, the intelligence officer approached him and asked, "How does one get to see the chief of the laboratory?" He explained to Kolumb that he wanted to deliver the materials sent to him by the Soviet scientist. The chief of the laboratory naturally was not there. Kolumb recognized the intelligence officer. A conversation then began which the intelligence officer utilized to support an acquaintance with Kolumb outside his institution. The intelligence officer said he was studying certain problems of an international character at the city library located not far from the laboratory. After this, the intelligence officer left without mentioning any future meetings. The following day the intelligence officer brought the material to the chief of the laboratory. After a week he phoned Kolumb to say that he had finished his work at the library on one of the problems and invited him to a simple lunch in order to celebrate its successful conclusion. In this way the development of Kolumb began.

As it turned out, the conclusions of the Residency concerning Kolumb were basically correct. Kolumb was indeed the son of a Jewish immigrant worker from Poland who had come to the U.S. at the beginning of the century. Kolumb had received his education at the cost of severe hardship. This did not help to teach him "patriotism." Besides this, Kolumb was writing his doctor's dissertation. He was receiving a very small stipend, which was not even enough to pay for his education and apartment. Kolumb was married. Having this in mind, the intelligence officer took steps from the beginning of the development to make sure that Kolumb's wife knew as little as possible about the character of his relationship with the intelligence officer. With this in view, the intelligence officer during his discussions with Kolumb characterized their relationship as a friendship between two men who were avoiding the interference of their wives.

It was decided to shorten the period of Kolumb's assessment and to prepare him for collaboration as rapidly as possible. During their long meetings (there were only six meetings—each from ten to twelve hours long, which included picnics, fishing trips, and excursions to the country) all development work was carried out, and after three months the intelligence officer was able to arrange a situation which would lay the foundation for Kolumb's cooperation with the Intelligence Service.

It had been learned that, because of his difficult financial position, Kolumb also worked as a translator-consultant in a firm and was its only specialist in his field. With this in mind, the intelligence officer decided to ask Kolumb to recommend some sort of a consultative firm in that field to him. On the chance that Kolumb would ask who needed this information, the intelligence officer was prepared to answer that a good friend of his, who was working in this field, badly needed some unclassified information on the production of tubes he named the type of tubes which were Kolumb's specialty). In connection

with this, the friend of the intelligence officer had sent him several hundred dollars, figuring that the intelligence officer could place an order for such information with one of the consultative firms. The intelligence officer scheduled this meeting for a time that Kolumb would receive the bills for his apartment and utilities.

The meeting went as follows. Having just received his bills, Kolumb was in a bad mood, and when the intelligence officer told him of the information he wanted, Kolumb became quiet.

We can assume that Kolumb was having the following thoughts, as anticipated in the plan: "If I recommend my firm, I will be undoubtedly assigned the job, and I would then get 10 to 15 percent of the money my friend pays the firm. It would be better if the firm had no part in this deal at all."

The proposal was accepted—Kolumb offered to write the survey. The intelligence officer agreed, saying that he didn't care whom he paid as long as the work was done. After this, it was not difficult over the next four or five months to teach Kolumb to pass to us information clandestinely for money.

The intelligence officer realized that his cover position did not satisfactorily explain to Kolumb his desire to obtain secret information. Therefore, he concocted a material interest in his relations with Kolumb. For this purpose he talked Kolumb into organizing a two-man firm, consisting of Kolumb and our intelligence officer, in which Kolumb would obtain the information and the intelligence officer would sell it. After this, it became easy to press all sorts of new requirements on Kolumb and to demand—literally demand—secret information from him. The formation of the "firm" did not of course make it more difficult for the intelligence officer to maintain control, although in a formal sense he was now dependent upon Kolumb. Since he "obtained" the money, the intelligence officer at all times remained the principal member of the firm and assigned tasks to Kolumb. Formation of the "firm" gave the relationship between our intelligence officer and the agent a spirit of partnership and doubtless made it easier to consolidate Kolumb's ties with Soviet Foreign Intelligence.

A deficiency in this edifice became obvious later when the question of the final recruitment and transfer of Kolumb to another one of our workers came up. It took a long time to talk Kolumb into working with a new intelligence officer.

The necessity of carefully investigating each and every case, no matter how sincere the American, is pointed out in the development of an American journalist who appeared, in the early stages of development, to be a plant.

Our Residency in Washington received a spotting report on a certain "Beys"—an American citizen born in India, who worked in the Washington office of the radio propaganda broadcasting service Voice of America.

A Soviet intelligence officer, after a lengthy search for Beys in the area where he worked, identified him through his automobile license plate and then made his acquaintance in one of the nearby drugstores. During their conversation, the intelligence officer promised to give Beys a book of interest to him at the request of a mutual friend. The intelligence officer arranged to meet him in one of the restaurants in the city. A week later Beys invited the intelligence officer and his wife to his home for dinner along with Beys' wife, who

was
sec
trie
tell
in
Ind

Eas
talk
ing
and

on
to
na
cor
the
in
att
Be
int

cal
cal
int
pro
the
wi
the

Re
int
cle
pl
th
he
in
in
cc
he
of

te
re
ill
pu
fr
p

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 365

was an American, and his brother. It turned out that Beys' wife worked as a secretary for the military attaché in the embassy of one of the Eastern countries. Beys criticized Western policy in the Asian countries. He asked the intelligence officer to recommend a store where he could buy Marx's *Das Kapital* in the English language. In addition, Beys stated that he was soon going to India on business connected with his work for the Voice of America.

The next meeting took place after Beys had returned from his trip to the East. Besides India, he had visited a number of countries in the Near East. In talking with the intelligence officer, he spoke of the strong anti-American feeling in these countries, resulting primarily from U.S. deliveries of arms to Israel, and of the sincere desire of these countries to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

Beys told the intelligence officer that he had written a number of articles on the situation in the Asian countries but that he didn't intend to give them to the Voice of America. Instead, he planned to publish them under a pen name in a weekly magazine of one of the Eastern countries for which he was a correspondent. Our intelligence officer cautiously asked Beys to tell him about these articles. Beys agreed and expressed a desire to publish one of his articles in some Soviet magazine. The intelligence officer said that this proposal merited attention and that he would try to interest the editor of a Soviet journal in Beys' material. Having thought it over for a moment, Beys promised to give the intelligence officer not only this article but also others which he was writing.

At the end of the meeting, Beys asked where the intelligence officer had called from when setting up their meeting and was relieved to learn that the call hadn't been made from the Soviet embassy. Taking advantage of this, the intelligence officer asked Beys not to phone him at work or at home. Beys proposed that they meet next time somewhere outside the city together with their wives, but the intelligence officer didn't go along with this. Saying that his wife wasn't feeling well, he suggested that they meet a week later in one of the suburban restaurants without their wives.

It is necessary to point out that, in developing relations with Beys, our Residency made an effort to determine the sincerity of his relationship with the intelligence officer on the basis of the information in his articles. It was quite clear to the Residency that in many ways Beys' conduct was similar to that of a plant. Included in this category were his ideological affinity and sympathy for the U.S.S.R., which were incompatible with his position at work; the fact that he had relatives abroad who were members of the Communist Party; his wife's intelligence potential, which might well have been calculated to increase the interest of our Intelligence Service in him; Beys' initiative in writing articles containing information of possible interest to our intelligence; and the fact that he expressed a fear that the FBI would learn of his contact with the intelligence officer.

At the next meeting our intelligence officer carefully determined the intelligence potential of Beys at his place of work. Soon the intelligence officer received the article from him for publication in the Soviet press, along with illustrations for it on film. Beys requested that certain details be altered when publishing the article and photograph—that the figures of two people be deleted from the photograph since the film had been developed by an American company.

In the course of further discussion, Beys again expressed his sympathy toward the Soviet Union as a friend of India, and accepted in principle our intelligence officer's suggestion that he prepare material, not for newspapers but for him personally. For this purpose he was to use nonofficial data received from his wife, friends, and acquaintances. At the same time a regular meeting was arranged with Beys. Beys indicated that he was interested in receiving an honorarium for his article.

At the meeting in late June, Beys received an honorarium of \$100 from the intelligence officer for his first article and passed him a second one. He complained that like most Americans, he had no faith in tomorrow and said that his and his wife's combined earnings came to only \$600 or \$700 a month.

Beys agreed to the intelligence officer's suggestion that they arrive together rather than separately when holding a meeting in a restaurant and that Beys, rather than the intelligence officer, order the meal. He said: "You're right, the waiters might realize that you are a foreigner. If I talk to them and select and order the food, they will think that we are just two American businessmen. And this won't arouse any interest in us. In this country it is customary to enter a bar or restaurant together."

At a regular meeting in the beginning of July he said that he had been called in by an agent of the FBI and had been asked whether he was having contacts with any foreigners. According to Beys, he did not tell the FBI about his acquaintance with the intelligence officer. Subsequently Beys saw that he was under FBI surveillance. Beys said that he didn't know the cause of FBI interest in him—whether this was a routine precautionary investigation or whether the FBI had received information of his contact with the intelligence officer.*

Beys did not bring the promised article to this meeting. He was noticeably upset. It was only after two weeks that Beys calmed down and the intelligence officer could have a long talk with him in order to determine his intelligence potential, with particular emphasis on his contacts and sources from whom he could obtain the information.

The regular and alternate meetings between our intelligence officer and Beys did not take place. It was not until the middle of August that they saw each other again. When the intelligence officer asked Beys whether he had brought the material, he replied: "Besides the risk, I'm spending much of my own time and effort. I am not rich enough to give them away. I realize that if I write such articles for you, sooner or later I will find myself in the electric chair. I'm sure the FBI is watching your every move. Someday they will discover our contacts, and that will be the end of me. I don't want to lay down my life here, in this damned country of gangsters and political criminals. You know that I work in a government institution, and by oath I must inform the security service of all my friends and contacts. If I conceal them, not only can I lose my job but I could also land in jail. Therefore, if you want me to give you nonofficial material, I must know specifically the size of my honorarium

* Often when a KGB officer clandestinely meets an agent, a KGB colleague follows to ensure that the meeting is not under counterintelligence surveillance. Possibly through such procedure the KGB had assured itself that the FBI was not trailing Beys to his rendezvous with the Russian.

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 367

in order to weigh it against the risks of losing my head and the well-being of my family. Don't think that I am trying to extort money from you. No, I am only concerned with the well-being of my family."

Beys promised to give information orally: "I can tell you everything that I know and everything that you want to know about the organization in which I work, but for the time being I am going to refrain from writing it down."

The intelligence officer explained that the amount of the honorarium would depend upon whether Beys could obtain documentary authentic information on the activities of U.S. governmental circles, for which he would receive a lot of money. Apparently this placated Beys, and he gave his word that he would write the article he had promised the intelligence officer and to give it to us at the next meeting.

Ten days later Beys brought a report which he had written on the basis of information from the military attaché of one of the Far Eastern embassies in the U.S.

The intelligence officer gave Beys an advance of \$200 and promised more if the information he had given on the plans of the U.S. in the Near and Middle East proved to be accurate. At the same time the intelligence officer instructed Beys to write a detailed report on the activities of the Voice of America and to clear up questions concerning the structure of this organization, its financial setup, and its sources for the information it uses. . . .

Having analyzed the intelligence officer's work with Beys, the Center came to the conclusion that their relationship had now progressed beyond the point of being merely a confidential contact and told the Residency to complete the development and assessment of Beys within two months' time and to present its recommendations concerning his recruitment.

At the end of October Beys supplied information on increased broadcasting activity by the Voice of America directed to Europe, particularly Hungary.

In the beginning of November the intelligence officer could not make his regular meetings with Beys since he was under surveillance. Several days later, having taken appropriate measures, the intelligence officer waited for Beys at the entrance to his home, where he made contact with him and proposed that they meet ten minutes later at another place. At this meeting Beys gave the intelligence officer information on the operating schedule of the Voice of America for the European countries and received \$200 from him.

The next meeting took place in two weeks. At this time Beys handed over information on U.S. military installations in the countries of the East, which received a good evaluation from the Center.

The Center decided to train Beys, as an agent, in methods of clandestine communication. At a regular meeting at the end of December, the intelligence officer completed the recruitment and obtained the agreement by Beys to cooperate with Soviet Foreign Intelligence. Beys told the intelligence officer that he had waited a long time for this meeting since he knew that the intelligence officer was interested in secret material information, and he was prepared to sell it to him if necessary measures were taken to ensure his security.

After the recruitment, Beys continued to pass us valuable information for money.

The above example shows that despite a number of circumstances which

seriously alarmed our Residency in the course of development, it was possible to determine that the recruitment target was not a plant—his information was reliable, and its receipt did considerable harm to U.S. interests.

The operational experience of Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residencies in the U.S. includes cases in which various approaches to the development target have been successfully combined. This is illustrated by the following example from the experience of our New York Residency.

Glebov, an intelligence officer assigned to this Residency, enrolled in one of the New York universities to study English. On joining the class, he immediately turned his attention to "Poynt," an Italian born in 1925 who worked for the representatives of one of the major Italian airlines in New York, and who had also joined the group in order to improve his English. As it turned out, Poynt planned to remain in the U.S. and become an American citizen. Glebov quickly made friends with Poynt and soon concluded that he could be recruited as he was sympathetic toward the Soviet Union and was in great need of money because of his numerous affairs with women. Because of this combination of the ideological-political and material motivations, Poynt was passing Glebov information, albeit of little value, within about two months after initial contact and was being paid for this in order to consolidate the relationship.

The Residency decided to make a detailed assessment of Poynt's potential. With this aim, it arranged for another of our intelligence officers, Alekseev, to become acquainted with Poynt. Alekseev was an engineer and could develop the intelligence potential of Poynt along the lines of scientific and technical intelligence more successfully than Glebov.

During this period, meetings with Poynt took place openly, as he was not yet trained in clandestinity. For example, prior to meeting with Poynt in a restaurant, our intelligence officers picked him up at home in a taxi. Alekseev noted a somewhat adventuresome spirit in Poynt. From the very start, both Poynt and Alekseev liked one another. After a two-hour discussion, it was clear to Alekseev that Poynt possessed a great deal of intelligence potential.

During the evening of the same day, Glebov obtained Poynt's agreement to work with us; however, Poynt categorically refused to sign a written agreement. Contact with Poynt was transferred to Alekseev.

In passing material to the intelligence officer, Poynt said that he didn't understand the necessity for the "intensified" (as he expressed it) clandestinity of their meetings, since he was engaged in normal business. Having heard him out, Alekseev realized the necessity of instilling appropriate work habits in Poynt, so as to establish agent relations with him in the future. Therefore, he told Poynt that clandestinity was necessary not for Poynt's sake but for the sake of the intelligence officer, who, being a Soviet diplomat, had no legitimate cause for interest in technical matters.

This explanation completely satisfied Poynt, and he didn't question the need for clandestinity again. And when Poynt began to pass us secret materials, he came to recognize the need for clandestinity for himself as well.

After the operation had been going on for five months, it was decided to give Poynt a permanent system of communications. When our intelligence officer began to explain this system to him, Poynt burst into laughter. It turned

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 369

out that Poynt had run across passwords, recognition signals, alternate meetings, etc., so often in various detective and spy novels that he had come to believe that the authors had thought them all up. He was simply amazed that real intelligence work—and he already understood by this time that he was cooperating with an intelligence service—employs such “antediluvian” methods. The response of the intelligence officer, which lasted about an hour, boiled down to the following: Intelligence itself and all its so-called methods in themselves are not new and have been used for a long time. The specific application of those methods is another matter, which is entirely dependent upon the skill and experience of the intelligence officer. Here, for the first time, Alekseev intentionally called Poynt an intelligence officer.

Posing the problem in this manner, which was necessary in this case, pleased Poynt very much, and he asked the intelligence officer to share his “art” with him. This was utilized when training Poynt to detect external surveillance, to open safes, etc.

After about ten months Poynt was removing secret material from a safe at work. At the same time, the possibility arose of finding him more interesting work in the U.S. after he received his American citizenship.

It became clear that Poynt, because of his amiable personality, was an excellent spotter. He had extensive contacts among people working in industry. Utilizing opportunities arising from his work, he brought us some cards containing their addresses and data about their jobs and announced that he could become acquainted with any one of them. Later on he very carefully studied three of them. These persons were then developed by our Residency.

After about a year, Poynt came to Alekseev with the following request: “A year ago when your friend Glebov proposed that I sign a contract, I refused to do this since, despite my friendship for him, his proposal that I work for you seemed insufficiently serious to me. Now I am convinced of the importance of my cooperation with you. You even called me an intelligence officer once. Therefore, I want to become a staff member of your Intelligence Service. But of course, when I grow old and leave this game, I ask that you guarantee me a pension.”

This signing of a contract at the request of Poynt took place at a special organizational meeting. By this time Poynt had become one of the most valuable agents of our Residency.

At one time our Residency in New York got hold of a certain “Del,” who was a Spaniard by nationality and the son of a noted Republican who had fled Spain to France after the victory of Franco. Del had dual citizenship—Spanish and French. He was an economic specialist but at the time of contact was out of work. He had an interesting appearance: he had typical sharp Spanish features and enjoyed great success with women. He was married to a Russian whose parents had left Russia during the Revolution. Del’s wife had retained her sympathy for her native country.

A member of the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residency, an employee of the U.N., became acquainted with Del at one of the parties organized by the U.N. for the purpose of introducing its workers to local residents with the aim of popularizing the organization. The acquaintance was made as follows: Del’s wife, who worked in a store, took the initiative at the party and approached

370

KGB

our intelligence officer, having recognized that he was a Soviet. She later introduced Del to the intelligence officer.

Subsequent meetings with Del took place without his wife, as it was not expedient to include her in the process of developing Del. In order to make the next steps appear natural, our intelligence officer chose a day for the next meeting when Del's wife would be busy at work. At this meeting the intelligence officer convinced Del that common knowledge of their meetings would principally be injurious to Del, as he did not have American citizenship. They agreed to meet without their wives. Several meetings were held in the city. Up to this time principal attention was given to the establishment of friendly relations with Del, to developing a progressive ideological spirit in him, and to assessing his intelligence potential, which turned out to be rather limited. Being jobless, Del possessed limited contacts which were of no intelligence interest. In order to test Del, the intelligence officer proposed that he buy samples of electrical equipment which Soviet citizens could not obtain. In a confidential manner, it was explained to Del that the purchase of such items by Soviet representatives could attract the attention of the authorities. According to standard business procedure, our intelligence officer offered Del a 10 percent commission, telling him that it would be necessary to pay this amount to any businessman. Del successfully made these purchases.

Subsequently, Del was given a more important assignment, to purchase a sample of a restricted piece of electrical equipment. This was within the realm of possibility for Del, since he had a friend who, according to Del, formerly had been involved in risky operations; for example, he had supplied certain gangsters with weapons at a good price and had even shipped large consignments of weapons to the Cuban army. Del took advantage of his friend and succeeded in talking him into getting the equipment in which we were interested. Del purchased the equipment and safely brought it to our intelligence officer. He also received a commission for this. This completed the initial testing of Del. The intelligence officer began to have clandestine contacts with him. In order to initiate a meeting with the intelligence officer, for example, Del placed a signal in a little-used stairway in the U.N. Building. Soon after this, the recruitment meeting took place, thereby consolidating the relationship which had developed.

In order to increase his intelligence potential, Del got a job as a non-staff correspondent on a local magazine. This helped him to legalize his position and made it possible to intensify his contacts among U.N. employees from various countries and to obtain certain economic and political information from them. Del did well in this work—he was able to establish useful contacts with many acquaintances of his father and to use them for intelligence purposes. However, the information coming from these sources was still of insufficient quality. For example, he was unable to obtain documentary information.

After this, it was decided to use Del as a recruiter. Our Residency had become interested in a female employee who had access to valuable information. The Residency figured that this young American woman might be attracted to Del. Therefore, they recommended that he make the acquaintance of this woman and establish good relations with her. Del successfully coped with this task. Having made the acquaintance of the female employee, he soon began

RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 371

to live with her. After studying his new acquaintance carefully, Del began to exert an influence on her. On Del's recommendation, for example, she changed her job within her organization and immediately obtained direct access to documentary information.

After a certain amount of time, Del began to cultivate his female friend in the interests of our intelligence. Somehow, in conversation with her, he directed her attention to the fact that she spent less on clothes than many of her colleagues. To her reasonable remark that on \$70 a week there's not much one can do, Del asked: "And how do the others manage to buy clothes?" Then he explained that her girl friends had supplementary incomes, since they sold the information that comes their way to various correspondents. Del recommended that she do the same thing. After some reflection, Del's female friend agreed with his suggestion. Del convinced her that it would be safer if he were to sell the material. She agreed to this, and he started to pay her money regularly for each document.

In analyzing this recruitment development, it is clear that the intelligence officer took a calculated risk in establishing an agent relationship with a foreigner who did not have American citizenship and who had limited intelligence potential. But as subsequent events proved, this risk was fully justified. The Soviet intelligence officer's correct interpretation of Del's personal qualities showed the expediency of acquiring his cooperation and made it possible for the Residency to acquire a valuable recruit.

Under current conditions, material incentives should be used to consolidate an agent relationship, even in those cases where the basic factor motivating an American to cooperate with our Intelligence Service is ideological. Disregard for the material incentives of an agent sometimes causes recruitment development to miscarry and may even result in the loss of an American already recruited.

Despite the acquisitiveness of an overwhelming majority of Americans, intelligence cooperation based on material incentives should not become a simple "barter" arrangement. Americans understand that unlike commercial activity, agent relationships with Soviet Foreign Intelligence subject them to great risk, and they appraise any relationship which has developed with our workers very carefully. Therefore, considerable tact must be used in giving money, and account must be taken of the degree to which the agent has been prepared for this. . . .

An intelligence officer of our New York Residency had contact with a valuable agent who was obtaining for us samples of equipment and top-secret material concerning research in the field of atomic energy. The intelligence officer took over this agent immediately after his recruitment, on an ideological and political basis, by a worker of the Center. The agent was of Russian extraction and very sympathetic toward the Russian people, a fact which was used in his recruitment.

Even though there was considerable difference in ages (the agent was twenty years older than the intelligence officer), the intelligence officer was able to develop the proper relationship with the agent, who came to consider the intelligence officer to be his only link with the motherland and came to feel toward him as he would toward his own son.

372

KGB

The Residency utilized this attachment, and in order to consolidate the relationship introduced an element of material interest in his relations with our intelligence officer.

At a regular meeting with the agent, the intelligence officer told the agent that the directors of the entire Intelligence Service had expressed gratitude for the material which had been received earlier and had awarded them a bonus—\$100 to the intelligence officer and \$500 to the agent. The agent was flattered by this. However, when the intelligence officer offered him the package with the money, the agent announced that he was working with us for patriotic reasons and would not take the money.

"Are you trying to say that I'm not a patriot?" asked the intelligence officer. "I need the money, and it will be very difficult for me if I also refuse it. Still, I will have to do this if you refuse."

"And do you need the money very much?" asked the agent.

"Very much," answered the intelligence officer.

"Well, all right," agreed the agent.

Therefore, as a result of using a correct approach to the agent, it became possible to further consolidate the relationship through the use of material incentive. After this, the agent frequently accepted money from us without any argument.

For purposes of development or for consolidating a relationship, it is particularly important to note the expediency of bringing Americans out of the United States to third countries where the operational climate is more suitable. It is especially desirable to use the People's Democracies and in certain cases even the U.S.S.R. When doing this, it is necessary to have a convincing pretext for such a trip.

In conclusion, it is necessary to discuss the more characteristic peculiarities of recruitment in the U.S. At the present time the principal method used to recruit Americans is that of gradual development. This does not mean that a well-prepared recruitment of an American by the direct method cannot be effective. As regards the basis for recruitment, the most effective one at the present time lies in a combination of ideological motivation and material incentives. . . . In carrying out recruitment operations in the U.S., Soviet intelligence officers must take into consideration the following peculiarities of the operational climate:

1. The attempts of U.S. counterintelligence to block the possibilities of Soviet intelligence officers' access to foreigners through the development of an extensive agent network in the area surrounding Soviet installations and targets of interest to Soviet Foreign Intelligence.
2. The availability to American counterintelligence of information on the experience and modus operandi of Soviet Foreign Intelligence in the U.S.
3. Widespread dissemination to the population by the counterintelligence services of information on the methods and approaches used by Soviet intelligence officers in developing that part of the local population which is of recruitment interest to Soviet intelligence.
4. The comparatively rapid reaction of U.S. counterintelligence organs to individual changes in the methods and approaches used by Soviet intelligence officers. In connection with these peculiarities, exceptional importance is at-